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Financial Modernization: The Effect of the Repeal of
the Glass Steagall Act on Consumers and
Communities
Articles, Essays, and Summarized Remarks of the
Panelists
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act:
Overview of the Key Provisions;
Presentation Before the
State of New York Banking Department
David L. Glass*
INTRODUCTION
After more than 20 years of debate and controversy, in
November 1999 the Congress overwhelmingly approved legislation to
reform the antiquated legal structure that governs the delivery of
financial services in the United States.' The President signed the
bill - denominated the "Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" (the "Act") in
recognition of its three principal sponsors - into law on Friday,
November 12.2 Title I of the Act - repealing the Glass-Steagall Act
and allowing for the formation of "financial holding companies"
("FHCs") by banking organizations wishing to expand into other
financial activities - takes effect on March 11, 2000 (i.e., 120 days
David L. Glass is an attorney with Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells LLP in
New York City, Chairman of the New York State Bar Association's Banking Law
Committee, and an adjunct professor of Banking Law at New York Law School and Pace
University School of Law. He was formerly General Counsel of the New York Bankers
Association.
1 See Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) [hereinafter Gramm Leach-Bliley Act]. See also Adam
Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Financial Services Reform, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (Summer,
2000).
2 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
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after the Act was signed into law).3 The Federal Reserve ("Fed") and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") have issued
proposed regulations (discussed below) to implement Title I. 4
.The original objectives of the Act's sponsors - repealing the
Glass-Steagall Act and allowing banks to affiliate with insurance
companies - could have been accomplished with a few well-chosen
sentences. As finally enacted, however, the Act spans 380 pages
spread across seven separate titles.5 The reason, of course, is that it
reflects a delicate balance among the competing, and often quite
different, concerns of large and small banks, thrift institutions,
securities firms, insurance* underwriters, and independent insurance
agents, as well as a panoply of federal and state regulatory authorities
and consumer groups. 6  Title I, which repeals Glass-Steagall and
allows banks, brokerage firms and insurance companies to affiliate,
alone requires 119 pages.
Thus, it is evident that the Act is a highly complex and far-
reaching piece of legislation, the full effects of which will only
become apparent over time. The white paper included as Exhibit A to
this memorandum outlines the basic elements of the reform package
and highlights their significance to banks and other financial services
firms generally. The purpose of this memorandum is to review in
more depth selected topics that may be of particular interest to the
Department in the exercise of its supervisory functions.
I. THE BASIC DILEMMA: WHY THE ACT IS SO COMPLEX
The financial services sector is fragmented in the United
States to a degree unparalleled elsewhere in the developed world.8 In
3 See Craig M. Wasserman, After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - A Road





5 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
6 See Ted Johnson, Financial Services Modernization, 19 LIMRA'S
MARKETFACTS ISSUE I (Jan. 2000), available at 2000 WL 19629215.
7 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 1.
8 See Simon H. Kwan & Elizabeth S. Laderman, On the Portfolio Effects of
Financial Convergence - A Review of the Literature, 1/1/99 FED. RESERVE BANK S. F.
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part, this is a product of historical accident, and the evolution of the
federal system: fifty state laws regulate the insurance business, while
securities dealers and banks are subject to concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction.9  But this fragmentation also reflects deliberate policy
choices, grounded in the uniquely American fear of the aggregation of
financial power. 10  Whatever merit these policy choices had when
banks were largely confined to a single state, they are an increasingly
costly anachronism in a world where capital flows freely across
national boundaries.
The problem is that, for better or for worse, the respective
constituencies for these policy choices all had an active role in the
legislative process that led to the Act. 1' Thus, while in some respects
the Act represents measurable progress toward the objective of full
reform of financial services, in others it accomplishes little or
nothing. 12 Indeed, in a few areas - for example, transactions among
affiliates under Federal Reserve Act Section 23A and sharing of
customer information with third parties - it results in a structure that
ECON. REV. ISSUE 18 (Jan. 1999) (citing that the financial services industry is shaped by
legislation that separates banking from commerce and commercial banking from
investment banking thus fragmenting the financial services sector).
9 See Edward Staples, Historic Law Remakes Market Place for Banking,
Securities and Insurance, 94 LIFE ASs'N NEWS ISSUE 12 (Dec. 1999), available a 1999
WL 15843320.
10 Robert M. Jaworski, Financial Modernization: The Federal Government
Plays Catch-Up, 21 ABA BANK COMPLIANCE Issue 3 (Mar./Apr. 2000), available at 2000
WL 12850698.
11 President's Statement on Signing Legislation to Reform The Financial
System, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2363 (Nov. 15, 1999), available at 1999 WL
12655245.
12 See Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 21-23 (2000) (explaining that banks lose their
exemptions under the investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act, and
noting the Act's increased independence requirements compared to current law, the
expansion of barring provisions of mutual fund directors from being employees, officer,
or directors of a bank's subsidiaries and affiliates, and the narrowed exemption from
Investment Company Act registration for bank common trust funds). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
1467a (c) (3) (A) (citing that the thrift holding company was previously required to only
conform its activities to those specified in HOLA only if the company owned more than
one thrift).
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is more restrictive than existing law. 13 Moreover, even the forward-
looking parts of the Act will only take shape as their provisions are
interpreted by the regulatory authorities, which may be expected to
proceed cautiously over terra incognita.
The remainder of this memorandum highlights some selected
provisions of the Act that may be of greatest interest to the
Department.
II. FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES
The core provision of the Act is authority to establish a new
kind of entity, known as a "financial holding company" (FHC). An
FHC may engage in a laundry list of financial activities, and the Fed,
in consultation with the Treasury, could from time to time approve
additional activities.1 4  Similarly, the Treasury (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency) could approve additional activities for
national bank financial subsidiaries (see below), subject to Fed veto.
15
This provision was a compromise, designed to address the stalemate
between Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin during the deliberations, regarding the respective
jurisdictions of the Fed and OCC. 16
In addition to a laundry list of permitted activities (including,
but not limited to, the "closely related" activities already allowed
under the BHC Act), the Act allows FHCs to engage in activities that
13 See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 1, 5 (citing provisions that
relate to affiliations among banks, securities firms and insurance companies as well as
provisions relating to privacy).
14 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103; see also Polking & Cammarn supra
note 12, at 3-7 (summarizing the financial activities that may be engaged in).
15 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
16 See Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A
Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 209 n.52 (stating
"The U.S. bank regulatory structure is extraordinarily complex, with shared and
overlapping jurisdictions for various federal and state authorities"). For a discussion on
the dual banking system, see Arthur E. William, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers,
the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1133 (1990).
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are "incidental" or "complementary" (discussed below) to financial
activities.
17
One of the potentially most significant changes is the explicit
authorization for merchant banking activities - i.e., the buying and
selling of all or a part of a company for investment purposes. 8 Under
the BHC Act at present, BHCs generally may not purchase more than
5 percent of the voting equity (or, by Fed interpretation, more than 25
percent of the total equity) of a company other than a bank or a
business "closely related to banking." 19  The Act removes this
restriction, as long as the investment is for bona fide merchant
20banking purposes, under rules to be issued by the Fed. Merchant
banking may not be done in a financial subsidiary of a national bank,
at least not for the first five years.
2 1
The Act also seeks to preserve functional regulation of each
FHC subsidiary, while at the same time giving the Fed "umbrella"
22oversight. Under a compromise crafted with the involvement of the
SEC and other regulators, the Fed has a reduced role (sometimes
referred to as "Fed Lite") with respect to subsidiaries regulated by
other authorities.23 It has general authority to supervise and oversee
these subsidiaries, but must rely to the extent possible on reports
provided by the primary regulator.24  How the Fed implements this
17 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
18 id.
'9 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c) (6) (1982); 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c) (8) (1982); 12
U.S.C. § 1843 (c) (13) (1982).
20 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103; See also Polking & Cammarn, supra
note 12, at 4 n. 13 ("... while a financial holding company may make merchant banking
investments in a company engaged in impermissible (e.g., commercial) activities in
excess of the 5% limitation set forth in section 4 the Bank Holding Company Act,... the
financial holding company's ability to extend credit to that company through one of its
depository institutions would be severely restricted if the financial holding company's
investment exceeds 15% of the company's equity capital.").
21 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
22 See Sarah A. Miller, Financial Modernization: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act-Summary (American Bankers Association), 1 A.L.I. - A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. 53, 81 (Feb. 2000).
23 id.
24 id.
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authority, and how "Lite" it proves to be in practice, remains to be
seen.
To become an FHC, an entity must first be a bank holding
company (BHC). 25 (Otherwise, the restrictions of the Bank Holding
Company Act would not apply, and the issue would be moot.) Thus,
an entity becoming a BHC for the first time - for example, Charles
Schwab Corporation, which is planning to acquire U.S. Trust
Company - must go through the full application procedure with the
Fed, as well as obtaining Banking Board approval to acquire a New
York bank. However, it appears that the election to be an FHC may
be made simultaneously with applying to be a BHC, so that a two-step
process is not required.
26
KEY POINT: without electing FHC status, a bank holding
company may not expand its activities beyond those already
permitted.27
The Act requires that, in order to be an FHC, the BHC certify
that its depository institution subsidiaries all are well-capitalized and
well-managed, and that they have at least "satisfactory" CRA
ratings.28 Its election to be an FHC becomes effective on the 3 1st day
after notice is filed with the Fed, unless the Fed accelerates the
29
process.
On January 19, the Fed published interim regulations to
implement this provision. 30  The interim rule takes effect on March
11, and the Fed has said that it will try to act by March 13 on all FHC
25 Id. at 63. See also Charles M. Horn & Brian W. Smith, Financial
Modernization In The New Millennium: Implementation Of The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
116 BANKING L. J. 689, 691 (1999) (stating that, "... any bank holding company, all
depository institution subsidiaries of which are well-capitalized, well-managed, and have
a satisfactory or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as of their
last examination, may file an election with the Federal Reserve Board to become an
FHC.").
26 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103; See also Christopher J. Bellini &
Robert C. Eager, Financial Services Modernization-A Summary Of The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 4 no. 7 ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & CoM. REP. I (Dec./Jan., 1999/2000).
27 See Miller, supra note 23, at 63.
28 See id.
29 See Horn & Smith, supra note 26, at 692.
30 Id.
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notifications received by February 15.31 The Fed will continue to
accept comment on the rule through March 27, with a view to
publishing a final rule shortly thereafter.
32
The interim rule retains the definitions of "well-capitalized"
and "well-managed" that already appear in the Fed's Regulation Y,
with some modifications. 33 In essence, "well capitalized" means that
the bank has Tier One capital of at least 6 percent, and total capital of
at least 10 percent, of its risk-adjusted assets under the Basel formula,
and also meets the leverage test of 3 percent Tier One capital to total
assets. 34  "Well managed" generally means at least a composite
"satisfactory" rating at the last examination.35
On its face, the Fed rule appears to simply implement the
mandate of the Act.36 However, there are several areas in which it
already threatens to be more restrictive than the Act may have
contemplated.
* First, although the Act only requires that the depository
institution subsidiaries be "well capitalized," the rule
states that the Fed reserves the right to put restrictions on
the activities of an FHC if its consolidated capital at the
holding company level is not up to snuff. This appears to




32See Wasserman, supra note 3, at 214.
33 William J. Sweet, Jr., After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act- A Road Map For
Banks, Securities Firms and Investment Managers- Interim Rules, Final OCC Rules And
Proposed Rules Under The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1184 PLI/CoRP 219, 471-472
(2000) (defining "well-capitalized" and "well-managed").
34 See Stacie E. McGinn, Impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on The
Insurance Industry, 1185 PLI/CORP 113, 120-21 (Mar. 2000).
35 See Sweet Jr., supra note 34, at 471.
36 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
37 See Lee Meyerson & Gary Rice, Strategies for Financial Institutions In the
New E-Commerce Economy- The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 1156 PLI/Corp 961,
980-981 (1999) (describing the "source of strength" doctrine).
8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVII
9 Second, while the Act mandates that the Fed develop
comparable standards for assessing the capital of foreign
banks that seek to become FHC's, the rule proposes
potentially more difficult standards. 38 The foreign bank
could be well-capitalized either by meeting the Basel test
on a consolidated basis, or by obtaining a prior ruling from
the Fed based on a variety of factors.
39
KEY POINT: The latter procedure reverses the self-
certification procedure that applies to domestic BHC's.
40
More generally, the Act itself contains significant pitfalls for
the unwary. If an FHC falls out of compliance with the well-
capitalized or well-managed requirements, it will have a six-month
period to cure the violation.41 If it cannot do so, it will be forced to
divest either its bank subsidiaries or its new financial activities. 42 And
if a subsidiary bank falls out of compliance with the CRA
requirement, the FHC will be barred from making acquisitions or
commencing new activities.
43
KEY POINT: electing FHC status is a two-edged sword:
without it, the new powers granted by the Act are not available, but it
subjects the FHC to potentially Draconian penalties if it falls out of
compliance. 44 Institutions should consider carefully whether electing
FHC status is necessary to achieve their business objectives.
38 See Sweet, Jr., supra note 34, at 471 (explaining what the Board may take





41 See Sweet, Jr., supra note 34, at 470.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Compare Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842, with
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.1338; see also Stacie E.
McGinn, Impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on The Insurance Industry 1185
PLI/CORP 113, 121-23 (Mar. 2000) (discussing the requirements of electing FHC status
and the penalties that are imposed when an institution falls out of compliance).
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II. GLASS-STEAGALL REPEAL
The Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act was motivated by a
belief - largely discredited by modem scholars - that bank
involvement in the securities markets had caused the stock market
crash of 1929 and the subsequent withering away of economic
activity.45  Glass-Steagall took aim at separating the functions of
commercial and investment banking, in four principal ways.
* First, it forbade banks to underwrite securities with certain
exceptions, of which the most important are U.S.
Government securities, municipal general obligations, and
certain municipal revenue bonds.
46
* Second, it prohibited firms engaged in underwriting from
taking deposits.
47
* Third, Section 20 of Glass-Steagall specified that banks
may not be affiliated with any company "engaged
principally" in underwriting securities.
48
* Fourth, Section 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibited
interlocking directors and management personnel between
41 See Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 3, at 7-8; See also Jane E. Willis,
Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional Approach to Reform, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
221, 229 (1995) (stating that at the time there was a "widespread belief that bank
securities activities caused the Great Depression"); A. J. Herbert Ill, Requiem on the
Glass-Steagall Act: Tracing The Evolution and Current Status of Bank Involvement In
Brokerage Activities, 63 TUL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1988) (pointing that Glass-Steagall Act
was enacted in 1933 as a response to widespread bank failure during Depression era).
46 See Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1933) [hereinafter Glass-Steagall
Act]; see also Herbert, supra note 46, at, 163-65 (presenting an overview of the Glass-
Steagall Act Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32); Gregory C. Menefee, Comment, Securities
Activities Under The Glass-Steagall Act, 35 EMORY L. J. 463, 471-73 (1986) (presenting
an overview of the Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16, 20, 21, 32).
47 Glass-Steagall Act § 16.
48 Glass-Steagall Act § 20.
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVII
a bank and a comTpany "primarily engaged" in
underwriting securities.
4T
IV. BANK AFFILIATION WITH BROKER-DEALERS
The major breach in the Glass-Steagall wall occurred in the
1980's, as the Federal Reserve determined, and the courts agreed, that
as long as the preponderance of a bank affiliate's business was not the
underwriting of "ineligible" securities - those that a bank cannot
underwrite directly - it would not be "engaged principally" in
underwriting, and thus would not violate Section 20.50 With a decade
of experience, the Fed has progressively liberalized this authority, by
allowing more types of securities to be underwritten and approving
additional activities to be included in the revenue "base" (the
"denominator"), for the purpose of computing the permissible amount
of "ineligible" underwriting. 5 1 Most importantly, in 1997 it raised to
25 percent, from 10 percent, the maximum amount of revenue a bank
affiliate could derive from "ineligible" underwriting, without being
deemed to violate the "engaged principally" test. 52
This change made possible such major transactions as the
acquisition of Alex. Brown by Bankers Trust's parent holding
company.53  But the 25 percent limitation, along with operating
restrictions imposed by the Fed, continued to hamper the ability of
bank-affiliated broker-dealers to compete.
54
49 Glass-Steagall Act § 32.
50 See Daniel Kadlec et al, Bank on Change In Repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act, Congress is Giving its Blessing to what Bankers have Already Done. Expect Fewer
Banks. Hope For Better Ones, TIME MAG., Nov. 8, 1999, at 50 (tracing the decline of the
Glass-Steagall Act through the last two decades).
51 Id.; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Modernizes
Financial Services, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 2000, at col. I (stating that the Act allows more
types of securities to be underwritten than had previously been allowed under the Glass-
Steagall Act).
52 See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank
Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg.
68,750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
53 See Business Brief, Bankers Trust New York Corp.: Takeover of Alex.
Brown is Closed for $2.8 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1997, at C26.
54 id.
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KEY POINT: the Act sweeps away the vestiges of Sections 20
and 32 of Glass-Steagall, thereby allowing for unrestricted affiliations,
and director and officer interlocks, between banks and broker-dealers,
without regard to revenue percentages.
55
New York has its own "mini Glass-Steagall" law (Banking
Law § 130 (9), which similarly prohibits a New York bank from being
affiliated with a company "engaged principally" in ineligible
underwriting.56 In 1986, then-Superintendent Jill Considine
interpreted this provision to allow up to 25 percent of revenues, so
that New York was in step with (if a decade ahead off) the Fed.
57
KEY POINT: The Act expressly preempts state anti-affiliation
laws, and thus apparently overrides mini Glass-Steagall.
58
The problem is that while the intent of Section 104 is
(apparently) clear, its drafting is less than artful. 59  It is aimed
primarily at state anti-affiliation laws in the insurance arena, of which
there are many; by contrast, New York appears to have the only anti-
affiliation law in the securities arena. More fundamentally, the
Section preempts state restrictions on depository institutions being
"affiliated" in ways allowed by the Act, but does not directly
reference management or director interlocks. 6 1 Arguably, therefore,
since the Act expressly preempts restrictions on affiliations, but not
restrictions on interlocks, it cannot be read to preempt the latter.62
55 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 101 (a) (b).
56 See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 130 (9) (McKinney 2000); See also Jill M.
Considine, A State's Response to the United States Treasury Department Proposals to
Modernize the Nation's Banking System, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S243, S247 (1991)
(dubbing New York's banking law as New York's "mini Glass-Steagall" law).
17 See Id. at S243, S247 n.20 (stating that New York's "mini" Glass-Steagall
Act has been interpreted to "allow banks to participate in securities underwriting up to
twenty-five percent of assets to enable both large money-center banks and smaller banks
to participate").
58 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104 (c).
59 Id.
60 Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104 (c). with N.Y. BANKING LAW §
130 (McKinney 2000).
61 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104 (c).
62 Compare id. with N.Y. BANKING LAW § 130 (4) (McKinney 2000).
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Nonetheless, the author believes that Section 104 might be
read to preempt the New York interlock restriction (Banking Law §
130 (4)).
* First, the intent of the Act to sweep away all such state law
restrictions is clear, given the history behind it.
63
Allowing laws restricting interlocks to stand would
frustrate the Act's objective of promoting unrestricted
affiliations.
64
* Second, Section 104 refers to "affiliated directly or
indirectly or associated with any person, as authorized or
permitted by this Act or any other provision of Federal
,65law (emphasis supplied)." Arguably, an interlock could
be construed to be an indirect affiliation.
" Third, the reference to "associated with any person" could
be read to refer to interlocks - i.e., a restriction on
interlocks would prevent a bank from being "associated"
(having as a director) a person who is a director of a
securities firm.
6 6
Thus, repeal of mini Glass-Steagall - which the Department
historically has favored and which is part of the Governor's proposed
reforms - remains desirable. At the least, it would harmonize New
York with federal law and make clear that interlocks are not
prohibited.67
63 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104 (c).
64 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 1 (explaining that the Act was enacted
"[t]o enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other
financial service providers... ")
65 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104 (c).
66 See id.
67 Supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
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V. DIRECT BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
With respect to the direct securities activities of banks, the Act
leaves the Glass-Steagall restrictions undisturbed - with one
significant exception. Under existing law, national banks are limited
to underwriting U.S. Government securities, municipal general
obligations, and municipal revenue bonds issued for "housing,
university or dormitory purposes.' 68 The Act allows national banks to
directly underwrite all revenue bonds, thereby eliminating a long-
standing anomaly. 69 This point was largely moot; a year earlier the
OCC had authorized revenue bond underwriting for a direct operating
subsidiary of a national bank.7°
On the down side, the Act eliminates the blanket exemption
for banks from being treated as broker-dealers under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.71 As part of the functional regulation
approach implemented in Title II, the Act requires banks to "push out"
some securities activities into securities affiliates subject to SEC
oversight. 72  Certain bank securities activities may be retained:
traditional trust activities, third-party ("lobby lease") brokerage
arrangements, sweep accounts, and underwriting U.S. government
securities are the principal ones.73 In addition, the Act creates a new
category, "identified banking products," which creates a safe harbor
from the push-out requirements. 74  This category includes, notably,
products such as loan participations and equity derivatives, as long as
68 See Glass-Steagall Act § 16.
69 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 151.
70 See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997).
71 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 201, 202.
72 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206; see also Polking & Cammam, supra
note 12, at 16 (stating that "because it is impracticable in many cases for a bank itself to
register as a broker-dealer, many securities activities . . . must be 'pushed-out' into an
affiliated securities firm").
73 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206; see also Polking & Cammarn, supra
note 12, at 16 (stating that "the Act contains certain exceptions to the general definitions
in certain 'identified banking products').
74 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206; see also Polking & Cammarn supra
note 12, at 16 (stating that "the Act contains certain exceptions to the general definition of
'broker,' allowing the bank to continue to effect transactions in certain "identified
banking products' without the risk of SEC regulation").
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they are sold to qualified investors.75 The bank may also continue to
do private placements if it does not have a securities affiliate, but it is
not likely that a bank that is active in the capital markets would meet
this test.
76
While subjecting these activities to SEC oversight fulfills the
Act's objective of functional regulation, the "push out" requirement
has a number of negative implications.
" First, the broker-dealer will be subject to SEC capital
rules, which may require greater capital for these
activities. 77  Moreover, in determining compliance with
capital adequacy standards on a consolidated basis, the
FHC will be required to deduct its investment in the
broker-dealer.
78
* Second, the record-keeping requirements applicable to
dealers are generally more burdensome.
79
* Third, bank loans to a broker-dealer affiliate generally are
subject to Section 23A, which may raise the cost of
financing these activities.8s
75 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206 (a) (5).
76 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 201 (B) (vii).
77 See Miller, supra note 23, at 68 (arguing that the new law will essentially
'push-out' any securities activities from the bank to an affiliated SEC-regulated broker-
dealer).
78 See Mitchell S. Eitel, William D. Torchiana & Donald J. Tourney, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act Provisions of Particular Interest to Insurers and Banks, 1184 PLI/CORP
495, 587 (Mar. 2000) (stating that "under the proposed capital rule, an FHC would be
required to deduct an amount equal to 50% of the total carrying value of its merchant
banking investments in no-financial companies for its regulatory Tier 1 capital").
79 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 231 (3) (A) (listing the record-keeping
requirements).
80 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121 (d); see also Polking & Cammarn,
supra note 12, at 14 (stating that "under the Act, the Federal Reserve Board is required to
adopt regulations to address, as covered transactions, credit exposures arising out of
derivative transactions between banks and their affiliates as well as intra-day extensions
of credit by banks to their affiliates").
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It should be noted that the "push out" provisions do not take
effect for 18 months, in order to allow time for banking organizations
to adapt to the new regulatory regime.
8 1
VI. INSURANCE AFFILIATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
The ultimate expression of the fear of financial "bigness" is
found in the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).82  Passed
initially in 1956, the BHC Act essentially forbids any company that
owns or controls a bank to engage in any other business, except those
deemed by the Fed to be "closely related to banking." 83 In 1982,
Congress amended the law to provide that insurance is not "closely
related to banking," with some narrow exceptions. 84 The legislation
does not repeal the BHC Act, and thus preserves its basic separation
of banking from "commerce" (see below). 85  Nonetheless, by
redefining insurance as a financial activity, it allows unrestricted
81 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 201, 202 & 209.
82 See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1845; see also Mark
J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 18
(1991) (stating that in response to the fact that banks were reincorporating themselves as
holding companies to receive regulatory advantages and expand by creating new
branches, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956).
83 See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1845 (c) (5)-(6); see also
Roe, supra note 83 (explaining that the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted a
holding company's activities to those closely related to banking).
84 See Martin E. Lybecker, Symposium, Striking the Right Balance: Federal
and State Regulation of Financial Institutions: Banking Regulation: The "South Dakota"
Experience and the Bush Task Group's Report: Reconciling Perceived Overlaps in the
Dual Regulation of Banking, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 71, 75 (1987) (stating that "in 1982
Congress amended section 4 (c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act to provide that,
subject to seven exceptions, "it is not closely related to banking ... for a bank holding
company to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or broker"); see also David L. Glass,
Insurance Powers: What Can Banks Do Now?, in THE NEW BUS. OF BANKING: WHAT
BANKS CAN Do Now, 1996, at 633, 642 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook
Series No. B4-7158, 1996) (explaining that since banking is not closely related to
insurance, Congress took away the Federal Reserve's discretion to approve insurance
activities).
85 See Note, Laura J. Cox, The Impact of the Citicorp-Travelers Group
Merger on Financial Modernization and the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 NOVA L. REV.
899, 904-906 (1999) (explaining that the United States is one of the few nations that
legally requires the separation of commercial and investment banking).
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affiliations between banks and insurance companies - provided, of
course, that the bank's parent has elected FHC status. Each would
remain subject to functional regulation, as at present.
86
VII. BANK INSURANCE POWERS
The Act preserves the basic, and hard won, powers of banks to
engage in insurance agency activities through affiliates. However, the
deference accorded to the OCC in the Barnett Bank and VALIC
decisions would be diminished in any future court dispute regarding
national bank insurance powers.87 Moreover, the political wrangling
between banks and insurance agents led to a complex, and carefully
worked out, set of provisions governing bank insurance sales.
88
Specifically, the power of states to impose thirteen enumerated
restrictions, regarding the manner in which insurance is sold, is
expressly preserved. 89 As noted, the Act expressly preempts the states
from prohibiting affiliations that are permitted under federal law, but
does require state insurance departments to be notified of an
acquisition by a FHC.
90
86 See Martha Cochran, Michael Mierzewski & Lisa Chavarria, New
Financial Modernization Legislation - The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in STRATEGIES FOR
FIN. INSTS IN THE NEW E-COMMERCE. ECON., 1999, at 599, 670 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract.
Course, Handbook Series No. BO-00E5, 1999) (stating that the insurance activities of any
person will be functionally regulated by the states).
87 Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996);
Nationsbank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
88 See Stuart C. Stock, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Insurance Activities
and Their Regulation: An Overview, in AFTER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT - A
ROAD MAP FOR INS. Cos., 2000, at 167, 169 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook
Series No. B0-00QU, 2000); see also Ivan E. Mattei & Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr., The New
Business of Banking and Insurance Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, in AFTER THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT - A ROAD MAP FOR INS. COS, 2000, at 147 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract.
Course, Handbook Series No. B0-00QU, 2000) (explaining that the Act is the result of
many years of debate negotiation "as to the optimal structure of a new combined banking,
insurance and securities industry").
89 § 104 (2) (b), 113 Stat. at 1338, 1353.
90 See Lee Meyerson & Gary Rice, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, in
STRATEGIES FOR FIN. INSTS IN THE NEW E-COMMMERCE ECON., 1999, at 961, 966 (PLI
Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series No. B0-00E5, 1999); see also Stacie E.
McGinn, Impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on the Insurance Company, in AFTER
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A summary of bank and FHC insurance powers post-Act will
be found in Exhibit B.
VIII. BANKING AND "COMMERCE"
One of the most controversial issues throughout the
deliberations was the extent, if any, to which banking and
"commerce" - i.e., nonfinancial activities - should be allowed to
mix.91 The major objective of the original BHC Act was, of course, to
separate banking and commerce. The version of H.R. 10 that
narrowly passed the House in 1998 would have allowed for the
"commercial basket" concept - i.e., it would have permitted an FHC
to derive up to 15 percent of its revenues from a "basket" of non-
financial activities. But that provision was not carried forward, and
the Act does not allow any mixing of banking and commerce.
As a compromise in eliminating the basket, however, the
House Banking Committee inserted a provision allowing FHC's to
engage in activities "complementary" to financial activities.93 Both
the Act and the accompanying report are silent on what this means.
Thus, presumably the Fed will have discretion to determine which
THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT - A ROADMAP FOR INS. Cos., 2000, at 113, 125 (PLI
Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series No. BO-OOQU, 2000).
91 Chairman Donna Tanoue, Federal Deposit Insurance Banking and
Financial Insurance Committee, H.R. 10, Financial Services Act of 1999, Address Before
the House Banking and Financial Committee (January 12, 1999) (transcript available in
the Federal News Service) (arguing that we should proceed cautiously in order to assess
the actual benefits and risks of permitting banking and commerce to mix).
92 See Significant Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, in SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, 1999, at 13, 82 (PLI Corp.
Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series B0-0061, 1999) [hereinafter Significant
Legislative Developments]; see also Cox, supra note 86, at 911-3.
93 See William J. Sweet, Jr., Interim Rules, Final OCC Rules and Proposed
Rules Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in AFTER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT -
A ROAD MAP FOR BANKS, SECURITIES FIRMS & INVESTMENT MANAGERS, 2000, at 219,
331 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series, 2000); see also Geoffrey M.
Connor, The Financial Services Act of 1999 - The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 71 PA. B.
ASS'N Q. 29 (Jan. 2000) (stating that a FHC is limited, with certain exceptions, to
activities involving banking, insurance and securities, as well as some "complementary"
activities).
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activities are complementary, and conceivably could use this authority
to allow some activities currently considered "commercial." Given
the Fed's long-standing opposition to mixing banking and commerce,
however, it seems unlikely it would use this authority very liberally.
94
IX. UNITARY THRIFT
One overhanging issue had been the ability of commercial
companies to own a single thrift institution (i.e., a savings and loan or
savings bank).95 This authority dates from a time when thrifts took
savings deposits, made mortgage loans, and generally were prohibited
from taking demand deposits or making commercial loans. 96  They
were not, and still are not, defined as "banks" under the BHC Act, so
that ownership of a thrift by a commercial company does not
implicate the BHC Act prohibition on mixing banking and
commerce.
97
The original BHC Act applied only to multi-bank holding
companies, until it was amended in 1970 to cover one-bank holding
companies as well. 98  But the parallel Savings & Loan Holding
Company Act continues to have an exemption for a company owning
only one thrift institution, as long as the thrift meets the "qualified
thrift lender" (QTL) test.99 In the modem world, the notion that these
so-called "unitary thrifts" do not mix banking and commerce is
94 See Significant Legislative Development, supra note 93, at 74 (citing
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Greenspan's objection to the mixing of banking and
commerce).
95 See Office of Thrift Supervision, Historical Framework for Regulation of
Activities of Unitary Savings and Loan Holding Companies, available at




" See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (i) (defining thrift institution, for the purposes of this
Act, as "(1) any domestic building and loan association; (2) any cooperative bank without
capital stock organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit; (3) any
Federal savings bank; and (4) any State-chartered savings bank the holding company of
which is registered pursuant to section 408 of the National Housing Act").
98 See Historical Framework, supra note 96.
99 Id.
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something of a quaint fiction, and seems difficult to justify as long as
the ownership of a commercial bank by a non-financial firm continues
to be prohibited.
KEY POINT: As passed, the Act grandfathers unitary thrifts
in existence on May 4, 1999, while prohibiting the establishment of
new unitaries going forward.100 However, it prohibits the sale of these
thrifts to non-financial companies. 101
The latter provision was adopted over the objection of
Chairman Gramm, who raised the specter of litigation against the
federal government because of the (presumably) lower value of
unitaries that cannot be sold to other commercial companies. °2 He
analogizes this situation to the recent successful lawsuits awarding
damages to thrifts that were hurt by legislation cutting back on their
ability to count certain intangibles in their capital.l°3
X. OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES
Historically, direct subsidiaries of a bank were restricted to
only those activities permitted for the bank itself.104 A controversial
rule issued by the OCC several years ago authorized national banks to
own direct subsidiaries engaged in a range of additional financial
activities - a function previously available only to holding company
o See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a (c) (9) (C) (explaining the preservation of authority
of existing unitary S&L holding companies that were in existence on May 4, 1999).
10. Id. § 1467a (c) (9) (A) (explaining that no company may directly or
indirectly acquire control of a savings association after May 4, 1999).
102 See 145 Cong. Rec. S4830, S4833-8 (daily ed. May 6, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Gramm) (debating that the so-called "unitary thrift loophole" was not a loophole, but
was created specifically by Congress. He further argued that these companies would have
a potential action for litigation "if we now come in and change the value of their
companies on the equity market instantaneously by 10 or 20 percent").
'03 Id. at S4838 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (holding that the Lucas' property was taken because he was denied
economical use of his land) and Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that
certaind dedication requirements is a taking)).
104 See Polking &. Cammam, Overview of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (April 2000) (explaining that "national banks may own an
'operating subsidiary', which, for the most part, may engage only in those activities that
are permissible for the national bank itself').
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affiliates under the Fed's jurisdiction. °5 This was a major bone of
contention between Fed Chairman Greenspan, who adamantly insisted
that the direct bank subsidiary is a threat to bank safety, and the
Clinton Administration, which threatened to veto a bill restricting
bank subsidiaries. 
106
The issue was settled with a compromise, whereby national
banks could elect "financial subsidiary" status for their operating
subsidiaries, if they could meet requirements analogous to those for an
FHC. 10 7 A financial subsidiary may engage in all activities deemed
financial, including securities underwriting, except for insurance
underwriting and real estate development. Merchant banking may not
be done in a financial subsidiary for the first five years; thereafter, the
Fed and OCC may agree to allow this.
10 8
Recently, Bank of America became the first national bank to
elect financial subsidiary status.10 9  This was done to allow its
insurance agency subsidiary to escape the "small town" rule, which
limits national banks and their operating subsidiaries to providing
insurance agency services only if they are located in a town of 5,000
or fewer people." 0 Presumably, the financial subsidiary also will
105 Id. (stating that the OCC has permitted national banks to own a subsidiary
engaged in activities which the national bank itself is precluded from engaging in
directly).
106 See Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for
Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1912 (1997) (explaining that
Chairman Greenspan has remarked that the "BHC model prevents the safety net subsidy
of banks from being made available, through the holding company, to the bank's
affiliates").
107 See Cammarn & Polking, supra, note 105; see also Adam Nguyen & Matt
Watkins, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 581 (2000) (stating that
"the legislation's reform measures allow commercial banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies to enter one another's businesses or merge more easily under a new
type of FHC." Furthermore, the legislation allows "new FHCs to own subsidiary
corporations involved in any activity deemed to be financial in nature").
108 See Cammam & Polking, supra note 105.
109 See A.J. Herbert Ii, Comment, Requiem on the Glass-Steagall Act:
Tracing the Evolution and Current Status of Bank Involvement in Brokerage Activities, 63
TUL. L. REV. 157 (1988); see also Cammam & Polking, supra note 105.
110 See Charles R. McGuire, Should Banks Sell Insurance? The Relationship
of Section 92 of the Banking Act, The McCarran - Ferguson Act and State Laws
Restricting Bank Activity, 22 J. LEGIS. 19 (1996) (explaining that Congress passed an
amendment in 1916 to the National Bank Act that "permitted banks to sell insurance in
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have greater flexibility to undertake other activities. The OCC has
recently issued preliminary regulations for electing financial
subsidiary status, which appear to track the statute. 
11
However, the financial subsidiary has a significant down side.
Currently, Section 23A does not treat direct bank subsidiaries as
"affiliates," meaning that loans and other covered transactions
between banks and their direct subsidiaries are not restricted. 112 This
approach is logical, in that a direct subsidiary engaged in bank-
eligible activities is really no more than a division of the bank itself.
But when it becomes a financial subsidiary, it undertakes non-bank
activities, and would have a competitive (actually, a regulatory
arbitrage) advantage over an affiliate, if it were not subject to the same
rules. This would, of course, have made financial subsidiaries more
attractive than FHC affiliates.
Interestingly, New York long has had an expansive "operating
subsidiary" rule, allowing a State bank to own a subsidiary engaged in
any line of business, not otherwise prohibited by law, provided three-
fifths of the Banking Board votes to approve. (Banking Law § 97
(5)).114 In 1996, following the Supreme Court decision in the Barnett
Bank case, 1 5 upholding the ability of national banks to sell insurance
communities with fewer than 5,000 people"); see also Catherine Edwards Heigel,
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Ludwig and Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. v. Clarke: The Banking-Insurance War in Search of a Judicial Truce, 55
OHIO ST. L. J. 929 (1994) (stating that the amendment added a small-town exception
allowing banks in smaller communities to sell insurance).
1 See Kevin M. Lesperance, A Unique Preemption Problem: The Insurance
and Banking,Industries Engage in War, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1141 (1997); see also
Bradley Sabel, Ban Mergers and Acquisitions: Federal Regulations Requirements to
Acquire Bank or Non Bank Subsidiaries by Foreign Banks, 857 PLI/CORP. 383 (1994);
see also Jonathan H. Rushdoony, Financial Services Litigation: Materials Submitted by
Jonathan H. Rushdoony, District Council, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Administrator of National Banks, 935 PLI/CORP 9 (1996).
112 See 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2 (1994) (stating that the term "insured depository
institution" has the same meaning in 12 U.S.C. § 1813).
113 See Rachel F. Robbins, Seventh Annual Financial Services Institute:
Underwriting and Investment Banking Activities: Life After the 'Section 20', 639
PLI/CORP. 43 (1989); see also Rachel F. Robbins, Banking Law and Regulation: Current
Issues in Product Expansion, 470 PLI/CoMM 53 (1988).
114 See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 97 (McKinney 2000).
"' 517 U.S. 25.
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in small towns (but prior to the enactment of New York's "wild card"
law, in 1997),"' Governor Pataki signaled the willingness of the
Insurance and Banking Departments to cooperate in using that
authority to enable State banks to sell insurance through
subsidiaries. 17 Neither version would limit agency-only activities of
a bank subsidiary; indeed, the Senate version would prohibit states
from limiting such activities as well.1 18
Presumably, between Section 97 (5) and the "wild card," the
Banking Board will continue to have the authority to enable State
bank operating subsidiaries to at least keep pace with national bank
subsidiaries. However, the ability of the Banking Board to approve
activities going beyond the national bank authority remains subject to
the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), which prohibits an
insured state bank from engaging, as principal, in any activity not
permitted for a national bank subsidiary, unless the FDIC concludes
that it poses no significant risk to the deposit insurance fund and the
bank is in compliance with minimum capital requirements. 1 9 Again,
however, FDICIA does not limit agency-only activities such as
insurance brokerage.
XI. WHOLESALE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A major attraction in the original H.R. 10 was the ability to
establish a "wholesale financial institution" (WFI). 120 Conceptually, a
WFI would be chartered as a bank, but would not be FDIC-insured.
State provisions requiring deposit insurance would be expressly
preempted for this purpose. A WFI could be formed de novo or by
the conversion of an existing bank. The appeal was that a WFI could
116 Id. at 37 (holding the "Federal Statute means to grant small town national
banks authority to sell insurance, whether or not a State grants its own state banks or
national banks similar approval").
117 See Press Release, State of New York Banking Department, Governor
Announces Two-Year Wild Card Banking Extension (June 18, 1998) (available at
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/prjunl8.htm (last modified Apr. 24, 2000)).
' See S. 298, 1 0 5th Cong. (1997).
119 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (2000).
120 H.R. 10, 10 5th Cong. (1997) (referring to proposed § 117).
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be owned by an investment bank without it becoming subject to the
BHC Act.12 1 The intent was to enable investment banks to take
advantage of a commercial bank charter without the full burden of Fed
regulation under the BHC Act, as long as the bank did not engage in
retail banking and was uninsured.
The attraction of the WFI was significantly diminished
compared with early versions of H.R. 10, primarily because of the
Act's "Fed Lite" supervisory provisions.122 With the prospect of less
intrusive Fed oversight of regulated FHC subsidiaries, there was less
incentive to avoid regulation as an FHC. Accordingly, during the
House/Senate Conference, the WFI's were dropped entirely from the
Act.
XII. FOREIGN BANKS
Under the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA), a foreign
bank with a branch, agency or commercial lending company in the
United States is subject to the BHC Act's non-banking restrictions,
even though it does not own a bank as defined under the BHC Act.
123
The Act does not change those provisions that currently do not apply
to foreign banks, such as CRA (not applicable to uninsured activities),
and does not compel "roll-up" of branches and agencies into bank
subsidiaries, as had been contemplated (and rejected) when the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA) was enacted in
1991.124
In common with a domestic holding company, a foreign bank
may choose to be treated as an FHC. As noted, the Fed is required to
develop capital and operating standards comparable to those of
domestic FHC's, although giving "due regard" to principles of
competitive equality and national treatment.12 5  A foreign bank
121 id.
122 §§ 111, 113, 115, 113 Stat. at 1362-72.
123 12 U.S.C. § 3102 (a) (2000).
124 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-8 (2000).
125 § 141, 113 Stat. 1383-4 (amending the International Banking Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. § 3106).
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electing FHC status would be subject to Sections 23A and 23B with
respect to transactions with affiliates.1 26  If the foreign bank elects
FHC status, it would forfeit its grandfather rights (if any) under the
IBA, with respect to financial and complementary activities permitted
for those entities. 27  This result may be unavoidable, as the Fed
would have the power, after two years, to impose the same restrictions
on grand-fathered financial activities as apply to FHC's.128 The
ability of a "qualifying foreign banking organization" (QFBO) to
engage in non-financial activities in the United States would not be
affected.
The Fed is given expanded regulatory authority to impose
additional restrictions on foreign banks in the public interest. In this
regard, the Act addresses a concern of foreign banks that this authority
could apply extraterritorially. 129  The prior version arguably could
have applied to any transaction between a foreign bank and a U.S.
affiliate. The Act incorporates language developed by the Institute of
International Bankers, which makes clear that it would apply only to
transactions between the U.S. banking operations and the U.S.
affiliate, unless the Fed were to determine that the foreign bank was
using a foreign office to evade requirements that otherwise would
apply.'
30
126 See Sweet, supra note 94 (stating application of sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act to foreign banks operating in the U.S.); see also Charlotte
Roederer, Conducting Due Diligence: Special Issues Raised in Banking Acquisitions, in
Conducting Due Diligence 2000, 1176 PLI/CoRP 687, 713 (2000) (applying the
limitations of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to certain covered
transactions between a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank and a U.S. securities
affiliate).
127 See Mitchell S. Eitel, et al., After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, A Road
Map for Insurance Companies: Gramm-Leach Bliley Act Provisions of Particular Interest
to Insurers and Banks, 1185 PLI/CoRP 7 (2000) [hereinafter Insurers and Banks]; see also
Mitchell S. Eitel, et al., After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, A Road Map for Banks,
Securities Firms and Investment Managers: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provisions of
Particular Interest to Insurers and Banks, 1184 PLIICoRP 495 (2000) [hereinafter Banks,
Securities Firms and Investment Managers].
128 See Insurers and Banks, supra, note 129; see also Banks, Securities Firms
and Investment Managers, supra, note 129.
129 §§ 101-61, 113 Stat. at 1341-84.
130 § 141, 113 Stat. at 1383.
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The Act also authorizes the Fed to examine any affiliate of a
foreign bank conducting business in any state, in order to enforce
compliance with federal banking law. 131 It also amends the definition
of "representative office" in the IBA, meaning that a representative
office application could be required with the establishment of any
subsidiary in the United States.
132
XIII. COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
A major bone of contention in the deliberations leading to the
Act was its effect on the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the
1977 law that requires banks to reinvest in their local communities.
133
Senate Banks Chairman Gramm opposes CRA on ideological
grounds, and the Senate versions had a number of provisions that were
anathema to Democrats, including President Clinton, who has
threatened to veto unless these CRA provisions are removed. The
House version was much more acceptable to CRA advocates.
134
As enacted, the Act made two substantive changes in CRA.
131 § 142, 113 Stat. at 1384.
132 Id.; see also Paul L. Lee, Regulation of Foreign Bank Offices in the United
States After the Foreign Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, in IMPACT OF THE
FDICIA: ONE YEAR LATER, 1992, at 507, 513 (PLI Com. Law & Pract. Course,
Handbook Series A4-4403, 1992) (amending the definition of a "representative office" by
requiring that a foreign bank, which maintains an office other than a branch or agency, to
register that office).
133 See Materials Submitted by the Office of the General Counsel Recent
Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the SEC, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 2000, at
103, 117 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series BO-0OGF, 2000) [hereinafter
Recent Legislative Developments] (summarizing the Congressional hearings about the
CRA). See also Miho Kubato, Note, Encouraging Community Development in
Cyberspace: Applying the Community Reinvestment Act to Interest Banks, 5 B.U. J. SC.
& TECH.L. 8 (discussing Congressional mandate that financial institutions provide local
public benefits).
134 See Annual Review of Banking Law, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 1 (1999)
(discussing the compromise over the CRA); see also Recent Legislative Developments,
supra note 136 (summarizing the discussion in both the House and the Senate with
regards to the CRA).
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First, it provides for less frequent examinations of smaller
banks ($250 million in assets or less). 135 They would be
examined not more than once every 48 months if they
have a "satisfactory" rating, and not more than once every
60 months if the most recent rating was "outstanding."'
136
Second, it creates a "sunshine" requirement, essentially
mandating the disclosure of the terms of any agreement
entered into with a community group in order to induce its
withdrawal of a CRA protest. 37 Failure to comply with
the disclosure requirement may cause the unenforceability
of the agreement, and diversion of funds to private uses
will lead to disgorgement.
138
It should be noted that the Act does not affect the ability of
states, including New York, to administer and enforce their own CRA
requirements for State-chartered institutions.
XIV. PRIVACY
Finally, the Act devotes an entire Title to an issue that wasn't
even on the radar screen when the deliberations began: customer
privacy. 139 Surveys show that customers resent the large volume of
private information held by banks and others, and the sharing of that
135 § 809 (a), 113 Stat. at 1469. See Polking & Cammarn, supra note 105
(explicating the effect of the Act on the CRA).
136 § 809 (a), 113 Stat. at 1469. See Polking & Cammarn, supra note 105
(discussing small bank ratings and examination).
137 § 711, 113 Stat. at 1466 (amending the Federal Deposit Insurance act to
set forth the "sunshine" requirements).
' § 711, 113 Stat. at 1468 (detailing violations by persons other than insured
depository institutions and their affiliates).
139 §§ 501-27, 113 Stat. at 1436-50. See also H.R. Con. Rep. No. 106-434 at
265 (1999) (emphasizing the presence of a portion of the act devoted to consumer
privacy); see also Polking & Cammarn, supra note 105, at 28 (stating "[i]n terms of
overall effect, the most significant provisions of the GLB Act may be found in Title V, its
privacy provisions.").
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information with others. Both the Senate and the House considered,
but rejected, the more restrictive measures put forth by consumer
advocates, whereby banks and others would be required to give the
customer an opportunity to opt out before sharing any customer
information with a third party, including an affiliate. An even more
extreme amendment would have forbidden the sharing of information
with affiliates (which is specifically allowed under federal law, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, provided the customer has a chance to opt
out).
The primary elements of the Act's privacy requirements are as
follows:
" Privacy Rules Apply Only to Non-Public Information:
The Act defines "non-public personal information" as
information that (a) is provided by a customer to a
financial institution, (b) results from any transaction with
the customer or any service performed for the customer, or
(c) is otherwise obtained by the institution.
40
" Annual Privacy Policy Disclosure Required: A financial
institution must disclose its privacy policies when a
customer relationship is formed and at least annually
while that relationship continues. Disclosure must be
clear and conspicuous and in written or electronic form.
141
It must describe (among other things) the institution's
policies for maintaining private information and sharing
such information with both affiliated and non-affiliated
third parties, the categories of information that the
institution will collect, the categories of persons to whom
the information may be disclosed, and the institution's
policies regarding former customers' information. 142 For
these purposes, an "affiliate" is any company that controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with another
company.
140 § 509 (4) (A), 113 Stat. at 1444.
141 § 503 (a), 113 Stat. at 1439.
142 § 503 (b), 113 Stat. at 1439.
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" Customers May "Opt-Out" of Disclosure to Non-Affiliated
Third Parties: Before a customer's information may be
initially disclosed to non-affiliated third parties, a financial
institution must explain to each customer how it may "opt-
out" of such disclosure.' 43  As noted, in approving the
"opt-out" approach, Congress rejected the so-called "opt-
in" alternative, whereby no information could be shared
without the customer's affirmative consent.
44
" "Opt-Out" Not Required for Disclosure to Affiliates:
Other than the required notice (discussed in item 2 above),
the Act imposes no restrictions on a financial institution's
ability to share private information with affiliates.
45
Groups representing consumers and smaller financial
institutions had argued that either the "opt-in" or "opt-out"
process should apply even to affiliated party disclosures
(FCRA applies an opt-out approach to affiliate sharing).
However, the Act recognizes that a primary benefit of
cross-sectoral financial mergers will be to increase
economies of scale by pooling private information.146
* "Opt-Out" Not Required for Disclosure to Non-Affiliated
Service Providers: A financial institution may disclose
private information to non-affiliated third parties that
perform services or functions on behalf of the institution
141 § 502 (b), 113 Stat. at 1437.
144 See Mark D. Seltzer, The New Threats to Financial Privacy: Is There
Liability for Financial Institutions and Their New Antagonists, the Information Brokers,
43 B.B.J. 8, 21 (1999) (stating how the House rejected the opt-in amendment).
145 See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Retail Delivery of Financial Services after the
Gramm-Leach - Bliley Act: How Will Public Policy Shape the "Financial Services
Supermarket?" 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 39, 52 (remarking that the act's privacy provisions
do not seem to be unduly restrictive to financial institutions). See also L. Richard
Fischer, Emerging Issues in the World of Financial Privacy, in CONSUMER FIN. SERVS.
LITIG. 2000, at 339, 369 (PLI Corp. Law & Pract. Course, Handbook Series No. BO-
00NC, 2000) (stating the GLB Act imposes several new requirements on financial
institutions regarding their privacy policies).
146 § 502 (e), 113 Stat. at 1438 (providing general exceptions to the policy of
non-disclosure without the consumer opting-out).
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(including marketing the institution's own products or
services), without giving the customer an opportunity to
"opt-out," provided that this activity is disclosed to the
customer and the third party is required by contract to
maintain the confidentiality of information it receives
from the institution.
147
Disclosing Account Information to Telemarketers
Prohibited: A financial institution may not disclose a
customer's account number or similar form of access
number or access code for a credit card account, deposit
account, or transaction account to a non-affiliated third-
party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or
other marketing through electronic mail to the
consumer. 148
* Limits on Reusing Information: A non-affiliated third
party that receives private information from a financial
institution cannot disclose such information to any other
non-affiliated person unless such disclosure would be
lawful if made directly to that other person by the
institution. 149
* Exceptions to Privacy Requirements: The Act contains
several general exceptions to the privacy policy notice and
"opt-out" requirements, including disclosure with the
customer's consent or to effect a transaction authorized by
the customer, as well as disclosure required for certain law
141 § 502 (b) (2), 113 Stat. at 1437. See Sweet, supra note 94 (if a consumer
does not chose the "opt-out" option then the financial institution will be allowed to
disclose information to non-affiliated third parties); see also Michael Nelson, Financial
Services Workshop, in FIRST ANNUAL INST. ON PRIVACY LAW: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL
COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH TECH AND CHANGING REGULATORY ENV'T., 2000, at 330, 369 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No.
GO-00G0, 2000) (explaining exceptions to the "opt-out" rules).
"' § 502 (d), 113 Stat. at 1437-8.
149 § 502 (c), 113 Stat. at 1437.
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enforcement, regulatory, and similar reasons.150
Regulations that will implement the Act's privacy
provisions may establish additional exceptions to the
requirements concerning notice, "opting-out," and
limitations on reusing information and sharing account
information with telemarketers.
Enforcement and Effective Date: The privacy rules will be
enforced by the "federal functional regulators," state
insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission
with respect to the entities that they regulate under federal
or state law. 151 (The "federal functional regulators" are
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board
of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
National Credit Union Administration Board, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.) The Act
establishes no separate civil or criminal penalties for
violating the Act's privacy provisions, but sanctions
imposed by the relevant federal regulatory agencies under
their existing statutory authority would presumably cover
such conduct. 52  In addition, Congress rejected an
amendment proposed by Senator Richard C. Shelby of
Alabama that would have permitted enforcement of the
Act's privacy rules through private lawsuits.
150 § 502 (e), 113 Stat. at 1438.
'5' § 505, 113 Stat. at 1440.
152 See Thomas P. Vartanian, Online Banking and Alternative Online
Payment Mechanisms: Selected 21"t Century Money, Banking & Commerce Alerts, in
FOURTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INST., 2000, at 761, 771 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. GO-00D6, 2000) (the FTC
may impose sanctions for failure to adhere to the privacy rules); see also Polking &
Cammarn, supra note 105, at 32 (explaining that the privacy provisions of the GLB act do
not preempt any state statute, except to the extent that the state statute is not inconsistent
with federal privacy provisions).
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" The relevant federal agencies are directed to issue final
regulations implementing the Act's privacy rules within
six months after the Act becomes law (i.e., mid-May
2000). Those regulations shall take effect six months
thereafter, unless the relevant agencies specify a later date.
* Report on Information Sharing Practices Among
Affiliates: Looking ahead to possible changes to the Act's
privacy requirements, the Secretary of the Treasury (in
conjunction with other relevant federal agencies) must
prepare a report by January 1, 2002 concerning
information sharing practices among financial institutions
and their affiliates.' 53  The report is to focus on the
purposes of information sharing, the adequacy of security
protection, and the potential risks and benefits from such
sharing, and it is to contain recommendations for
appropriate legislative or administrative action. 
154
* Stronger State Privacy Rules Not Preempted: During the
final stage of the legislative process, many consumer
groups argued that the proposed federal privacy rules were
too lax. As a compromise, Congress adopted an
amendment proposed by Senator Sarbanes of Maryland to
provide that the Act's privacy rules will not supercede a
state's privacy requirements simply because the state
provides stronger consumer protections than are available
under federal law. 155 The Sarbanes Amendment, however,
is likely to be controversial and will probably be the
153 § 508, 113 Stat. 1442-3. See L. Richard Fischer, Emerging Issues in the
World of Financial Privacy, in FIN. SERVS. MODERNIZATION, 2000, at 243, 256
(American Law Institute- American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, 2000)
(explaining the mandate of Congress that requires the Secretary of the Treasury and
federal banking agencies to submit a report to Congress by January 1, 2002).
114 § 508 (a), 113 Stat. at 1442-3.
155 § 507, 113 Stat. at 1442.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI
subject of litigation before the interaction between federal
and state privacy policies is clarified. 1
56
* "Pretext" Calling Prohibited: The Act imposes criminal
penalties (including possible fines and prison terms) on
persons that obtain or attempt to obtain private
information under false pretenses (so-called "pretext
calling"). 157  The law establishes a number of narrow
exceptions to these prohibitions, including for purposes of
law enforcement, to permit an institution to test its own
security systems, to aid in the collection of child support,
to investigate insurance fraud, etc.
158
Congress is likely to revisit the subject of financial privacy
next year. Further legislative action could address inconsistencies that
might arise between state and federal privacy rules, as well as generic
privacy concerns that include, but extend beyond, financial services
(e.g., medical and related records).
Finally, the United States and Europe have continuing
differences regarding the rules that apply to cross-border
transmissions of private information. For example, the European
Commission's Privacy Directive (which became effective October 25,
1998, but has been suspended as to the United States pending the
outcome of continuing US/EC negotiations) prohibits the transmission
of personal proprietary data to third countries that lack an adequate
level of data protection. 159 Resolving the question of whether U.S.
156 See Donna N. Lampert, Internet Privacy: An Overview of Domestic and
International Issues and Policy Responses, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONVERGENCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUS. AND FOR THE PRACT. LAWYER, 1999, at 359, 362-3 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. GO-
00B6, 2000) (discussing controversies surrounding the interaction between federal and
state privacy policies).
"' § 521 (a), 113 Stat. at 1446; § 523, 113 Stat. at 1448. See Mark D. Seltzer,
The New Threats to Financial Privacy: Is there Liability for Financial Institutions and
Their New Antagonists, the Information Brokers? 43 B.B.J. 8 (stating that obtaining, or
attempting to obtain, financial information relating to another person is criminal activity).
158 § 521 (b)-(g), 113 Stat. 1446-7.
159 See Karl D. Belguim, Who Leads at the Half? Three Conflicting Visions of
Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 72-74 (discussing -urrent negotiations
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law provides the requisite protection might also require further
Congressional action.
XV. OTHER PROVISIONS
The Act contains numerous other provisions. Two that may
be of interest are as follows.
First, the Act mandates that ATM operators disclose all fees
prominently, and prohibits the imposition of a fee without such
disclosure. 16  The effect of this provision is not onerous, since
network rules already mandate such disclosures. Query: does this
provision implicitly preempt local attempts to prohibit ATM fees,
such as those passed by San Francisco and Santa Monica, and the
proposal pending in the New York City Council, since it prohibits fees
only if the proper disclosures aren't made? Probably not, because it
does not affirmatively preempt more restrictive local laws.
Second, the Act requires the Fed to adopt, within 18 months,
rules under Section 23A regarding credit exposures arising from
derivatives transactions and intraday extensions of credit between
banks and their affiliates. 161  This has potentially significant
implications for bank securitization activities, since a special-purpose
securitization vehicle, even if not owned by the bank, could be
deemed an affiliate. 162 However, the Act does not mandate that the
Fed adopt any particular rule, and the Fed thus far seems to have
avoided applying 23A in a way that would interfere with what it sees
as legitimate securitization vehicles.
between the United States and the European Union over the 1995 Privacy Directive); see
also Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S138-40 (discussing
dangers related to inconsistent international data protection frameworks).
160 §§ 702-5, 113 Stat. at 1463-5.
161 See A. Patrick Doyle, New Financial Modernization Legislation - The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in FIN. SERVS. MODERNIZATION, 1999, at 106, 135-7
(American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education
Course of Study, 2000) (discussing derivative transactions and intraday credit).
162 id.
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